Whether allegedly libelous Facebook posts made in 2011, before the enactment of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, are punishable under Article…
Summary
The Supreme Court resolved whether allegedly libelous Facebook posts made before the Cybercrime Prevention Act can be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. Peñalosa posted defamatory statements on Facebook in 2011 and was charged with libel. The DOJ ordered withdrawal of the information, ruling no law penalized internet libel in 2011. The RTC dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the post was punishable under Article 355 of the RPC. The Supreme Court granted Peñalosa's petition, ruling that: (1) the proper remedy against withdrawal orders is appeal, not certiorari; (2) private complainants lack standing to file such petitions as only the State may appeal criminal cases; and (3) cyber libel is punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, not Article 355. The Court applied statutory construction principles and the non-retroactivity of penal laws, reinstating the dismissal and providing that civil remedies remain available.
Focus of dispute
Whether allegedly libelous Facebook posts made in 2011, before the enactment of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, are punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code; proper remedy against court orders granting motions to withdraw information; legal standing of private complainants to file certiorari petitions in criminal cases
Legal facts
On August 3, 2011, Jannece C. Peñalosa posted allegedly defamatory statements on Facebook against Jose A. Ocampo, Jr. An Information for libel was filed against Peñalosa in 2012. Peñalosa sought reconsideration with the City Prosecutor and filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. The DOJ granted her petition and ordered withdrawal of the information, ruling that there was no law penalizing 'Internet Libel' when the post was made in 2011. The RTC granted the motion to withdraw information and dismissed the case. Ocampo, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC and held that the Facebook post was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Peñalosa then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Judgement and reasoning
{"Court of Appeals": "Reversed the RTC decision. Held that Peñalosa's act of maligning Ocampo Jr.'s reputation through Facebook was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, which covers libel 'by any similar means.' Interpreted Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act as merely affirming that online defamation constitutes 'similar means' for committing libel under the RPC. Remanded the case for further proceedings.", "Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212": "Granted the Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed the libel case. The court made an independent assessment and concluded that the Facebook post constituted internet libel, but since the act was committed on August 3, 2011, before RA 10175 was enacted, there was no law penalizing internet libel at that time. Applied the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime when there is no law punishing it).", "Supreme Court (SC)": "Granted Peñalosa's petition and reversed the Court of Appeals. Ruled that: (1) the proper remedy against an order granting motion to withdraw information is appeal, not certiorari; (2) respondent lacked legal standing as only the State through the Solicitor General may appeal criminal cases; (3) the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. Applied noscitur a sociis rule of statutory construction to conclude that 'similar means' in Article 355 could not include online defamation. Held that cyber libel is punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, not under Article 355 of the RPC. Reinstated the RTC's dismissal order and made the TRO permanent."}