- Petitioner
- Rizalino B. Abella
- Respondent
- Atty. Sergio C. Sumayod
- Citation
- G.R. No. 269598
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Division
- Second Division
- Ponente
- J.Y. Lopez, J.
- Decided
- April 2, 2025
Summary
This case involves a dispute over the execution of testamentary provisions disposing of properties not owned by the testator. Petitioners, as heirs of intended beneficiaries under Josefina Abella's will, sought to compel execution of Paragraph 5 which disposed of shares in Pawing, Palo Properties belonging to other persons. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of their motion, distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic validity of wills. While probate courts generally address only extrinsic validity (due execution), they may examine intrinsic validity (proper allocation of rights) in exceptional circumstances. The Court applied the fundamental principle that one cannot dispose of what one does not own (nemo dat quod non habet), ruling that Josefina could not validly dispose of shares belonging to Irene, Teodoro, and Leon Abella. However, the Court noted errors in completely invalidating provisions regarding Josefina's own potential share and corrected misapplication of judicial admission principles. The decision reinforces limits on testamentary capacity while clarifying probate court jurisdiction over intrinsic validity issues.