Trespass to Dwelling in the Philippines (RPC Art. 280)

Generated: 2026-07-03 | Intellegal Deep Research

Answer Summary

The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a private person enters the dwelling of another against the latter’s will. The gravamen is the violation of the occupant’s right of possession and privacy, not ownership of the premises. The entry must be against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant — mere absence of permission is insufficient. If the offense is committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty is elevated. The law provides specific defenses, including entry to prevent serious harm to oneself, the occupants, or a third person, as well as entry to render service to humanity or justice. The crime under Article 280 differs from other forms of trespass under Article 281 in that the latter covers uninhabited, closed premises or fenced estates, with a manifest prohibition and no permission, and carries lighter penalties.

The governing statute is Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted the fine to not exceeding ₱200,000. The leading Supreme Court decisions are Salvador Marzalado, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 152997, 10 November 2004 (Third Division), which set out the elements and applied the harm‑prevention defense; Pedro Gabriel and Avelino Natividad v. People, G.R. No. L-6730, 15 October 1954, which defined implied opposition; and Augusto Balde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46980, 29 May 1987 (Second Division), which held that unfriendly relations suffice for a presumed prohibition.

The essential elements, as distilled from jurisprudence, are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) the entrance is against the latter’s will. The element of “against the will” may be shown by express prohibition or by circumstances existing at the time of entry that make it clear the entry is unwelcome. The law does not require that the occupant physically resist; the occupant’s conduct, such as telling the entrant to wait outside or closing the door, can demonstrate opposition. Ownership of the dwelling is not a defense if the occupant is in possession and objects. Defenses include entry to prevent serious harm (e.g., turning off a flooding faucet to avoid property damage) or rendering service to humanity or justice, provided there is a genuine exigency and no criminal intent.

Common failure points arise when prosecutors rely solely on the fact that entry was made without permission, without proving that the occupant had communicated an express or presumed prohibition. The case People v. Olimpio de Peralta, G.R. No. 17332, 18 August 1921, acquitted the accused because the prosecution only showed lack of permission, not prohibition. Similarly, a defense of ownership fails; in People v. Anacleto Uy Almeda, CA No. 507, 19 November 1945, the Court rejected the appellant’s claim, holding that even if he owned the house, he could not enter against the occupant’s will without a court order. Another pitfall is a mistaken belief that a suspicion of wrongdoing justifies entry — in Gabriel, entry by persons posing as Meralco inspectors to search for a stolen transformer was not excused by the service‑to‑justice exception because they lacked a search warrant.

Based on comprehensive database and web research, no rulings from 2024-2026 were found on this topic. The most recent controlling authority is Marzalado, Jr. v. People, 2004. The fines were last adjusted by Republic Act No. 10951 (signed 2017), bringing the penalty for Article 280 to arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱200,000, and for qualified trespass by violence or intimidation to prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding ₱200,000. Article 281 now carries arresto menor or a fine not exceeding ₱40,000, or both.

Section I — Issue Overview

1. What are the elements of trespass to dwelling under Article 280 RPC? — This issue identifies the precise legal requirements for a conviction, focusing on the meaning of “against the will” and how it is proven.

2. When is trespass to dwelling qualified, what defenses apply (including entry to prevent harm), and what are the penalties? — This issue examines the aggravating element of violence or intimidation, the statutory exceptions in the third paragraph of Article 280 and other justifying circumstances, and the applicable penalties for the basic, qualified, and attempted forms.

3. How does trespass to dwelling under Article 280 differ from other forms of trespass under Article 281? — This issue distinguishes the two trespass offenses under the Revised Penal Code based on the nature of the property, the presence of occupants, and the required state of mind, as well as the corresponding penalties.

Section II — Legal Analysis

Issue 1: Elements of Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280

Applicable Laws & Issuances

Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 10951) provides:

“Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000).”

The statutory text itself identifies two core components: the offender must be a private person, and the entry must be against the will of the occupant. The third paragraph enumerates exceptions (entry to prevent harm, service to humanity or justice, public houses while open) which are considered defenses rather than negating elements of the crime.

Case Law Analysis

Salvador Marzalado, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 152997 — 10 November 2004 (J. Corona, ponente not explicitly stated in materials but decided by the Third Division)

Focus of Dispute: Whether the accused committed qualified trespass to dwelling when he forcibly entered a rented unit to turn off a faucet that was flooding the property.

Facts: Petitioner’s mother owned a unit leased to complainant. After an ejectment judgment, complainant vacated but left a faucet open, causing flooding. Petitioner, with barangay officers, forced entry on 3 November 1993 to stop the flooding. Complainant filed a complaint for qualified trespass. The trial court convicted; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Arguments:

• Petitioner: His entry was justified under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the RPC (prevention of imminent danger to property) and under the third paragraph of Article 280 (entry to prevent serious harm).
• Respondent (People): The entry was against the will of the occupant; petitioner should have closed the main water valve instead of entering.

Disposition: The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted Salvador Marzalado, Jr.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court listed the elements of trespass to dwelling:

“In trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter’s will.”

The Court further held that “the gravamen of the crime is violation of possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.” The entry was justified because petitioner acted “for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother’s property caused by the open faucet,” and no criminal intent could be attributed to his remedial action. The Court applied the harm‑prevention exception under Article 280 and, implicitly, the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under Article 11(4).

Evidence Evaluated: The Court gave weight to the certification of the Barangay Lupon Secretary that the unit was “forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet,” and found that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Precedential Status: This case remains the controlling modern authority on the elements and the harm‑prevention defense. It is a Division decision but has not been overturned.

People v. Olimpio de Peralta, G.R. No. 17332 — 18 August 1921 (En Banc)

Focus of Dispute: Whether entry without permission, but without express or presumed prohibition, constitutes trespass to dwelling under Article 491 of the old Penal Code (identical to Article 280 in this respect).

Facts: Accused, successor as president of a union, entered the room of the former president to look for a desk glass. The room was part of a house rented by their common association. The door was closed but not locked. The former president was absent; two other persons were inside and one asked “Why did you enter without permission?”

Arguments:

• Prosecution: Entry was without permission, therefore against occupant’s will.
• Defense: Lack of permission does not equate to prohibition.

Disposition: The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court drew a critical distinction:

“the mere fact that the latter entered it, without the permission of the occupant, does not constitute the offense of trespass to dwelling … In order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should not be confused with prohibition.”

The Court quoted Groizard’s commentaries, noting that in ordinary life, one may call on a house without prior permission, assuming the owner has no objection unless prohibition has been communicated.

Evidence Evaluated: The prosecution only proved that the entry was without permission. There was no evidence that the occupant had expressed or implied a will prohibiting entry — the room was not locked, and the entry occurred during mid‑morning.

Precedential Status: The distinction between lack of permission and prohibition remains good law. Later cases consistently cite this principle.

Pedro Gabriel & Avelino Natividad v. People, G.R. No. L-6730 — 15 October 1954 (First Division)

Focus of Dispute: Whether entry into a dwelling against the implied opposition of the housewife constitutes trespass.

Facts: Accused, posing as Meralco inspectors, came to the house around 7 p.m. The housewife told them to wait on the porch, then went inside and closed the door. The accused forced their way into the living room and bedroom, searching with flashlights for a “transformer” they believed was used to steal electricity.

Arguments:

• Petitioners: They entered to render a service to justice (to uncover electricity theft).
• Respondent: The entry was against the will of the spouses, as shown by the wife’s conduct.

Disposition: Conviction for simple trespass to dwelling affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that opposition may be inferred from circumstances existing “prior to or at the time of the entry.” The wife’s act of telling the men to wait on the porch and closing the door “spoke louder than words” — it was an implied but unambiguous opposition. The defense of rendering service to justice was rejected because the accused only suspected the presence of the transformer and had no search warrant. The Court emphasized:

“the Court of Appeals believed that appellants merely suspected that there was a transformer in the house. That alone did not give them the right to enter the house against the will of its owner, unarmed as they were with a search warrant.”

Evidence Evaluated: The wife’s actions were taken as proof of opposition. The defense’s claim of seeing the transformer being hidden was not credible.

Precedential Status: This case is the primary authority on implied opposition to entry.

Augusto Balde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46980 — 29 May 1987 (Second Division)

Focus of Dispute: Whether unfriendly relations between the parties constitute a presumed prohibition sufficient to establish trespass.

Facts: Balde entered the dwelling of his cousin, Leonida Achacon, without her permission. Their relations were “so unfriendly” that the appellate court inferred the entry was unwelcome. A 10‑year‑old maidservant present did not give valid permission. Balde also laid hands on the victim after entry.

Arguments:

• Petitioner: The maidservant gave permission; there was no express prohibition.
• Respondent: The unfriendly relations constituted a presumed prohibition.

Disposition: Conviction for qualified trespass to dwelling affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court reiterated the gravamen: “entrance against the will of the complainant, or against the latter’s presumed or express prohibition.” The unfriendly character of relations gave “sufficient warning upon … appellant that his entry into (complainant’s) house was unwarranted and objectionable,” i.e., unwelcome and prohibited.

Evidence Evaluated: The appellate court found the prosecution witnesses more credible and that the housemaid did not actually give permission. The prior strained relations were a sufficient factual basis for presumed prohibition.

Precedential Status: Good law; used to support inferences of prohibition from circumstantial evidence.

People v. Anacleto Uy Almeda, CA No. 507 — 19 November 1945

Focus of Dispute: Whether ownership of the dwelling negates trespass or whether the occupant’s objection controls.

Facts: Almeda, claiming ownership of a house, went with companions to demolish and repair it despite the occupant Honorata Limpo’s objection. Her husband was absent; she objected to the demolition. Almeda’s men placed ladders and began removing boards. Entry stopped when a policeman arrived.

Arguments:

• Appellant: He had a right to enter because he owned the house; the notice of demolition implied consent.
• Appellee: The occupant objected; ownership is not a license to trespass.

Disposition: Conviction affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court declared ownership immaterial:

“the alleged ownership is immaterial, for even supposing that the house belonged to the appellant, that fact alone did not authorize him to do anything with or enter the house against the will of its actual occupant. He could have invoked the aid of the court for the exercise or protection of his alleged proprietary rights.”

It also held that criminal intent inheres in the unwelcome visit of a trespasser (except in cases under the third paragraph of Article 280).

Evidence Evaluated: The occupant’s objection was clear; the very purpose of entry had been objected to before the intrusion.

Precedential Status: Still good law; firmly establishes that ownership does not override the occupant’s right to exclude.

Doctrinal Synthesis

The elements of trespass to dwelling under Article 280 are threefold: (1) the offender is a private person, (2) he enters the dwelling of another, and (3) the entrance is against the latter’s will. The third element is not satisfied by mere lack of permission. The prosecution must show an express or presumed prohibition, which can be inferred from the circumstances existing at the time of entry — such as the occupant telling the entrant to wait outside, closing the door, the existence of unfriendly relations, or the very purpose of the intrusion being objectionable. Ownership of the dwelling is no defense if the occupant is in possession and objects; the proper remedy for the owner is a court order, not self‑help.

Recent Developments

No recent rulings or legislative changes (2024‑present) were identified through web research on this specific issue. The 2004 Marzalado decision remains the most recent detailed treatment of the elements.

Analysis

To prove trespass to dwelling, a practitioner must establish that the occupant’s will was opposed to the entry at the time it occurred. Evidence such as prior strained relations, verbal objections, physical barriers, or immediate protest after entry can support a finding of prohibition. Reliance on an after‑the‑fact discovery of entry is insufficient to convert an entry with tacit consent into trespass. The prosecution should also establish that the offender is a private person; public officers acting under color of authority may be covered by other offenses (e.g., violation of domicile under Article 128). The De Peralta case cautions that if the only proof is that entry was without permission, the case will fail.

Issue 2: Qualified Trespass, Defenses, and Penalties under Article 280

Applicable Laws & Issuances

Article 280, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10951:

“Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000). If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000). The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses, while the same are open.”

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code also lists justifying circumstances, including paragraph 4: “Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists, that the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it, and that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.”

Case Law Analysis

Salvador Marzalado, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 152997 (discussed fully in Issue 1)

In addition to the elements, the Court gave full effect to the third paragraph of Article 280. It found that petitioner entered “for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother’s property,” squarely within the exception for preventing serious harm to a third person. The Court also noted the absence of criminal intent:

“No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken.”

Thus, the defense of entry to prevent serious harm exonerates the accused, even if the entry is forcible. The Court also implicitly applied the state of necessity under Article 11(4), underlining that the harm avoided (flooding) outweighed the intrusion.

Precedential Status: The leading case on the harm‑prevention defense.

People v. Alberto Cosare, G.R. No. L-6544 — 25 August 1954

Focus of Dispute: Whether the presence of nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance in trespass to dwelling, and whether procedural defects vitiated the conviction.

Facts: Accused entered the dwelling at night and committed acts of lasciviousness. He was eventually convicted only of qualified trespass to dwelling with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.

Disposition: Affirmed; conviction for qualified trespass to dwelling with nocturnity upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: While the case primarily dealt with double jeopardy and jurisdiction, the Court implicitly recognized nocturnity as a generic aggravating circumstance that can increase the penalty within the range provided by Article 280. It did not treat nocturnity as an element that “qualifies” the offense under the Article 280 framework; the qualifying element within Article 280 is violence or intimidation.

Evidence Evaluated: Not detailed in materials.

Precedential Status: Confirms that nocturnity and similar generic circumstances may be appreciated against the accused.

People v. Enrico Esturis y Salvador, G.R. No. 45406 — 11 March 1937 (First Division)

Focus of Dispute: Proper penalty for attempted trespass to dwelling when mitigated by voluntary confession.

Facts: Accused was convicted of attempted trespass to dwelling upon a voluntary confession of guilt before the prosecution presented evidence. The trial court imposed one month of arresto menor and a fine of ₱200.

Disposition: Modified — penalty reduced to ten days of arresto menor and a fine of ₱150 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Ratio Decidendi: The penalty for the attempted stage is one degree lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applying the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be the minimum period of arresto menor (10 days) and a fine of less than ₱200, under Articles 280, 51, 64(2), and 71, as amended. The Court incorporated the adjustment from Commonwealth Act No. 217 regarding subsidiary imprisonment.

Precedential Status: Still relevant for penalty computation at the attempted stage.

Doctrinal Synthesis

Qualified Trespass: The offense under Article 280 is itself styled “Qualified trespass to dwelling,” but within the article there are two penalty tiers. The basic offense (entry against the will without violence/intimidation) is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine. The offense is “qualified” — in the sense of a higher penalty — when committed by means of violence or intimidation, in which case the penalty rises to prisión correccional in its medium and maximum and a fine. Generic aggravating circumstances like nocturnity may further increase the penalty within the applicable range.

Defenses: The third paragraph of Article 280 creates specific exemptions:

• Entry to prevent serious harm to oneself, the occupants, or a third person;
• Entry to render some service to humanity or justice;
• Entry into cafes, taverns, inns, and other public houses while they are open.

The defense of preventing serious harm requires a genuine, imminent danger. In Marzalado, an open faucet flooding the unit was sufficient. In Gabriel, the accused’s mere suspicion of electricity theft did not justify entry without a search warrant. The defense of rendering service to humanity or justice must be more than a pretext; acting without legal authority (e.g., without a warrant) will defeat it.

Additionally, the general justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly paragraph 4 (state of necessity), may be invoked. Marzalado demonstrates the overlap between the statutory exception in Article 280 and Article 11(4).

Penalties:

• Basic offense: Arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) and a fine not exceeding ₱200,000.
• With violence/intimidation: Prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱200,000.
• Attempted: Penalty one degree lower; for the basic form, arresto menor (1 to 30 days) and a fine, as demonstrated in Esturis (though RA 10951 fine limits must be considered).
• The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to allow an indeterminate penalty within the range.

Recent Developments

No recent rulings or legislative changes (2024‑present) were identified on defenses or penalty adjustments beyond RA 10951’s fine updates. The Marzalado decision (2004) remains the benchmark for the harm‑prevention defense.

Analysis

A practitioner defending a client under Article 280 should first assess whether the entry falls within the enumerated exceptions or a recognized justifying circumstance. The defense of preventing serious harm is potent when the danger is real and the response is proportional. However, the entry must be for the purpose of prevention; if the entrant creates or escalates the situation, the defense fails. In cases where violence or intimidation is alleged, the prosecution must prove that the means of entry involved force or threat; simple breaking of a lock without additional threat may not suffice if the entry was peaceful, though force against property can constitute violence. The elevated penalty requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the qualifying circumstance.

Issue 3: Distinction Between Trespass under Article 280 and Article 281

Applicable Laws & Issuances

Article 280 (quoted above) covers “the dwelling of another,” entered against the will.

Article 281, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10951:

“Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either or both of them are uninhabited, if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner.”

Case Law Analysis

Avelino Natividad, et al. v. Ricardo C. Robles, G.R. No. L-3612 — 29 December 1950 (En Banc)

Focus of Dispute: Whether a Justice of the Peace Court had jurisdiction over a charge of qualified trespass to dwelling, as the term “trespass on private property” in the Judiciary Act included qualified trespass under Article 280.

Facts: The case did not adjudicate the crime itself but resolved a jurisdictional challenge. The Court held that “trespass on private property” in Republic Act No. 296, §87(c), embraced qualified trespass to dwelling (Article 280) and distinguished it from the offense under Article 281.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court noted:

• Article 281 trespass covers “uninhabited closed premises’ or fenced estate'” and is penalized with arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding ₱200 (pre‑RA 10951).
• Qualified trespass to dwelling (involving violence or intimidation) is punished by prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods plus a fine.

While the ruling itself is about jurisdiction, it highlights the statutory distinction: Article 280 deals with dwellings (inhabited places), Article 281 with uninhabited closed premises or fenced estates.

Precedential Status: Cited for the jurisdictional scope, but the substantive distinction between the two articles is drawn from the statutes themselves.

Doctrinal Synthesis

The key differences are:

Thus, Article 280 protects the sanctity of the home and the occupant’s possessory right to exclude. Article 281 primarily protects property rights in uninhabited land or buildings where the owner’s prohibition is outwardly manifest. The penalties reflect this distinction — intrusion into a dwelling is treated more severely.

Recent Developments

No recent rulings (2024‑present) specifically elaborating on the distinction were identified. The amendments by RA 10951 only updated the monetary amounts.

Analysis

When determining the proper charge, the key factual question is whether the premises are inhabited and used as a dwelling. A house that is temporarily vacant but still the occupant’s residence may still be a “dwelling” for purposes of Article 280, but if it has been abandoned or is uninhabitable and the prohibition is manifest, Article 281 might be the correct charge. The presence of actual inhabitants at the time of entry is not strictly required under Article 280; the gravamen is entry against the will of the possessor, so even if the occupant is temporarily absent, as long as the premises constitute a dwelling, it is covered. Article 281 explicitly requires that the premises be uninhabited. The prohibition under Article 281 must be “manifest” — e.g., a fence, a locked gate, or a posted sign — otherwise the entry might not be criminal.

Section III — Action Plan & Evidence Guide

Recommended Strategy: The complainant should immediately document the unlawful entry, preserve all physical evidence, and secure affidavits from witnesses. The defense, if relying on the harm‑prevention exception, must gather proof of the exigent circumstances at the time of entry, such as barangay logs, photographs, or witness accounts. Both sides must pay close attention to the status of the property — whether it is a dwelling or uninhabited fenced estate — as this determines the applicable article.

Action Steps:

1. Preserve and photograph the entry point — Take clear, time‑stamped photographs of any broken locks, forced doors, or damage, as this proves violence or intimidation and the fact of entry.
2. Secure sworn statements of the occupant and immediate neighbors — Affidavits must detail the occupant’s will at the time of entry: what was said or done to express opposition, prior strained relations, or any manifest prohibition.
3. Obtain a certification from the barangay — If barangay officials were present during the entry (as in Marzalado), their certification can establish the purpose of entry and whether it was justified.
4. Check the nature of the property — Determine if the premises were inhabited at the time; if uninhabited, gather evidence of “manifest prohibition” such as “No Trespassing” signs, fences, or locked gates. This determines whether to charge under Article 280 or 281.
5. If acting for the defense, gather evidence of exigency — For harm‑prevention defense, collect utility bills, repair estimates, or photographs of the danger (e.g., flooding, fire hazard) to show the entry was necessary and proportional.
6. Verify ownership and possession documents — While ownership is not a defense, it may be relevant to establish the right of possession or to show the entrant had no legal right to exclude the occupant. Obtain title, lease contracts, or ejectment decisions.

Evidence Checklist:

• Photographs of the dwelling/premises showing condition before and after entry — to prove physical intrusion and any violence
• Affidavit of the occupant detailing the circumstances of opposition — to establish “against the will”
• Certificate of Barangay intervention or blotter report — to show contemporaneous report and possible justification
• Search warrant or court order (if any) — to evaluate the “service to justice” defense
• Proof of ownership or lease — to establish the possessor’s standing (obtained from the Registry of Deeds or the lessor)
• Fencing permits, “No Trespassing” signage — to prove “manifest prohibition” for Article 281

⚠️ This is AI-generated legal research for reference only. It does not constitute legal advice. Consult a licensed Philippine attorney before making important legal decisions.

References

Legislation & Regulatory Issuances

• Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)
• Amendments to Act No. 3815, the Revised Penal Code (Commonwealth Act No. 217)

Case Law

• Salvador Marzalado, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 152997 (10 November 2004)
• Pedro Gabriel & Avelino Natividad v. People, G.R. No. L-6730 (15 October 1954)
• Augusto Balde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46980 (29 May 1987)
• People v. Anacleto Uy Almeda, CA No. 507 (19 November 1945)
• People v. Olimpio de Peralta, G.R. No. 17332 (18 August 1921)
• People v. Alberto Cosare, G.R. No. L-6544 (25 August 1954)
• People v. Enrico Esturis y Salvador, G.R. No. 45406 (11 March 1937)
• Avelino Natividad, et al. v. Ricardo C. Robles, G.R. No. L-3612 (29 December 1950)
• Salvador Marzalado, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 152997 (Lawphil)