Whether the prescription period for unjust vexation was interrupted by the filing of a different criminal case (trespass to dwelling) involving the…
Summary
Felipe Abuy was charged with two separate criminal offenses arising from the same February 21, 1959 incident - first trespass to dwelling (dismissed), then unjust vexation. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust vexation case on grounds of prescription, holding that unjust vexation is a light offense that prescribes in 2 months under the Revised Penal Code. Since more than 6 months elapsed between the commission date and filing of the unjust vexation information, the offense had clearly prescribed. The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that filing the trespass case interrupted the prescription period, ruling that only the proper information corresponding to the specific offense can interrupt its prescriptive period. This case establishes the principle that criminal prescription is offense-specific and cannot be interrupted by filing charges for different crimes, even if committed by the same accused on the same date.
Focus of dispute
Whether the prescription period for unjust vexation was interrupted by the filing of a different criminal case (trespass to dwelling) involving the same accused on the same date
Legal facts
On February 21, 1959, Felipe Abuy allegedly committed acts leading to two separate criminal charges. First charged with trespass to dwelling on April 1, 1959 (Criminal Case No. 6751), which was dismissed on November 5, 1959 on prosecution's motion due to insufficient evidence. Subsequently charged with unjust vexation on November 13, 1959 (Criminal Case No. 7201) for acts allegedly committed on the same date (February 21, 1959) involving embracing and taking hold of complainant Nicolasa B. de Magadia's wrist in her dwelling. Abuy filed motion to quash the unjust vexation information on grounds of prescription.
Judgement and reasoning
{"Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City": "Denied prosecution's appeal, finding it 'unmeritorious and unfounded' and ordered return of records to court of origin.", "Municipal Court of Zamboanga City": "Granted motion to quash the unjust vexation information, ruling that the crime had already prescribed under Articles 89 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as the offense was committed on February 21, 1959 but information was filed only on November 13, 1959, exceeding the 2-month prescriptive period for light offenses.", "Supreme Court": "Affirmed the lower courts' decisions. Held that unjust vexation is a light offense prescribing in 2 months under Articles 90(6) and 9(3) of the Revised Penal Code. From February 21, 1959 to November 13, 1959 is 6 months and 20 days, far beyond the 2-month prescriptive period. Rejected prosecution's argument that filing of trespass to dwelling case interrupted prescription, ruling that only the filing of the proper information corresponding to the specific offense can interrupt its prescriptive period under Article 91."}