Whether criminal case for unjust vexation has prescribed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
Summary
This criminal case involves the prescription of unjust vexation charges against lawyer Manuel B. Gadon for allegedly grabbing a woman's breast. The municipal court dismissed the case, ruling it had prescribed because 83 days elapsed from the offense to filing the proper complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the original complaint for acts of lasciviousness effectively interrupted prescription for unjust vexation since both crimes involve molestation and what controls is the factual description, not the legal designation. The Court calculated that prescription ran only 25 days total, well within the 60-day limit. The case was remanded for trial, establishing important precedent on criminal prescription computation and the principle that factual allegations in complaints control over legal designations.
Focus of dispute
Whether criminal case for unjust vexation has prescribed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
Legal facts
On April 29, 1977, Manuel B. Gadon, a lawyer, allegedly grabbed complainant Remy G. Gomboc's left breast against her will, causing shock and indignation. Complainant filed multiple charges: first for acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 1995, dismissed), then re-filed (Criminal Case No. 1998, dismissed for lack of prima facie case), finally amended to unjust vexation (Criminal Case No. 2000). Accused moved to quash claiming prescription. Municipal judge granted motion and dismissed case.
Judgement and reasoning
{"Municipal Court of San Andres, Romblon": "Dismissed the case for unjust vexation on ground of prescription, ruling that 83 days had elapsed from commission of offense (April 29, 1977) to filing of proper complaint (July 21, 1977), exceeding the 60-day prescriptive period. Held that previous complaints for acts of lasciviousness did not interrupt prescription for unjust vexation.", "Supreme Court (SC)": "GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the challenged orders. Held that prescription period was properly interrupted by filing of original complaint on May 10, 1977, even though denominated as acts of lasciviousness, because the facts described constituted unjust vexation. Filing with municipal mayor was valid under Rule 112, Section 3. Calculated that prescriptive period ran only 25 days total, not exceeding 60-day limit. Remanded case for trial on the merits."}