- Statute
- Civil Code
- Article
- Art. 34
- Topic
- Liability of police for refusing to render aid
- Status
- In force
- Book
- Preliminary Title
- Chapter
- CHAPTER 2 Human Relations (n)
- Year
- 1949
- Cited by
- Multiple Supreme Court decisions
The provision
ARTICLE 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Intellegal Wiki · In plain terms
If a city or municipal police officer refuses or fails to give aid or protection to someone facing danger to life or property, that officer is primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality is answerable only in a backup (subsidiary) capacity. The injured person may bring this civil claim independently of any criminal case and needs only preponderance of evidence to win.
An editorially maintained plain-language explanation of this provision — not legal advice.
Key points
Article 34 makes a member of a city or municipal police force primarily liable for damages when, in case of danger to life or property, that officer refuses or fails to render aid or protection; the city or municipality is subsidiarily responsible.
The civil action is independent of any criminal proceeding and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The provision creates accountability for police inaction and is read alongside Articles 27, 29, and 30 in the human-relations and independent-civil-action framework.
The article creates a tiered liability: the police officer who refuses or fails to render aid is primarily liable, and the city or municipality is only subsidiarily responsible if the officer cannot satisfy the judgment. Because the civil action is expressly independent of any criminal proceeding and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence, an injured person may recover even without a criminal conviction of the officer. It complements Article 27 on neglect of official duty by public servants generally.
Cases applying this article
- Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Elvin Chan G.R. No. 157547
- Vicente Gomez Garcia v. Jacinta Hipolito G.R. No. 1449
- Flora L. Tubera-Balintec v. Heirs of Cesar L. Tubera G.R. No. 235701
- C.F. Sharp & Co. v. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation G.R. No. 179469
- Philippine National Construction Corporation v. The Honorable National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 101535
- Eugenio Cagaoan v. Felix Cagaoan G.R. No. 17900
- Jose Cojuangco v. Manuel Rodriguez G.R. No. 5359