Stages of a Felony: Attempted, Frustrated, Consummated (RPC)

Generated: 2026-07-03 | Intellegal Deep Research

Answer Summary

Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony may be committed in the consummated, frustrated, or attempted stage. The distinction hinges on the extent of the acts of execution performed and the cause why the intended harm did not materialize. A felony is consummated when all elements for its accomplishment are present; it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony but the result does not follow by reason of a cause independent of his will; and it is attempted when the offender commences execution directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution due to some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. For crimes against persons such as homicide, the Supreme Court has long applied the “subjective phase” test: a frustrated stage requires that the offender believed he had done everything necessary to kill, but death was averted by a cause beyond his control — typically timely medical assistance for a mortal wound. If the wound is not fatal, the crime is only attempted. The controlling doctrine was set in United States v. Lim San, G.R. No. L‑5335, 8 November 1910, and consistently applied in People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930, People v. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L‑5848, 30 April 1954, and Crisanto Amerga y Lapuz v. People, G.R. No. 250461, 20 January 2021.

The penalties for principals, accomplices, and accessories are graduated by degrees under Articles 50 to 57 of the Revised Penal Code. The principal in a frustrated felony suffers the penalty next lower in degree than that for the consummated offense (Art. 50); the principal in an attempted felony suffers a penalty lower by two degrees (Art. 51). Accomplices receive the penalty next lower than the principal’s penalty (Arts. 52, 54, 56); accessories receive a penalty two degrees lower (Arts. 53, 55, 57). Applied to homicide — whose prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal (Art. 249) — a principal in frustrated homicide faces prision mayor; a principal in attempted homicide faces prision correccional. Once the proper degree is determined, the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) fixes the minimum and maximum terms. Recent rulings in G.R. No. 254875 (13 February 2023) and G.R. No. 260944 (3 April 2024) reaffirm these penalty scales: for frustrated homicide, an indeterminate penalty of, e.g., 3 years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 2 months of prision mayor, as maximum; for attempted homicide, 3 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 3 years of prision correccional, as maximum.

To prove frustrated homicide, three elements must be established: (1) the accused intended to kill (shown by the use of a deadly weapon and the nature of the attack); (2) the victim sustained a mortal or fatal wound; and (3) the victim survived only because of timely medical intervention. The prosecution must prove the mortal character of the wound beyond reasonable doubt; mere possibility of death is insufficient. In Amerga, the Supreme Court downgraded the conviction from frustrated to attempted homicide because medical testimony left doubt whether the wound was truly fatal, holding that the second element was not proved. Intent to kill is equally critical: if the accused did not believe he had completed all acts of execution (e.g., he saw the victim escape after the first blow), the crime is only attempted, as shown in Sy Pio.

Common failure points in litigation include: (i) insufficient medical evidence regarding the nature, depth, and severity of the wound — a mere assertion that the victim “could have died” without treatment is not enough, as in Amerga (G.R. No. 250461); (ii) failure to prove subjective phase completion, where the accused’s awareness that he had not yet killed the victim downgrades the charge, as in Sy Pio (G.R. No. L‑5848); and (iii) overlooking that the defense may introduce evidence that the wound was not mortal or that the victim’s survival was not due solely to medical aid, which can reduce the crime to attempted or even to physical injuries.

The current legal regime remains unchanged since the enactment of the Revised Penal Code in 1930, with no legislative amendments to Articles 6 or 50‑57. The most recent authorities — G.R. No. 260944 (2024) and G.R. No. 254875 (2023) — confirm that the penalty graduation rules and the subjective-phase distinction continue to be applied without modification. Based on comprehensive database and web research, rulings from 2024‑2026 were found, including a 2024 decision (G.R. No. 260944) and a 2023 decision (G.R. No. 254875); no ruling from 2025‑2026 altered these principles.

Section I — Issue Overview

1. What are the stages of a felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and how are attempted, frustrated, and consummated felonies distinguished — particularly for homicide? This issue governs the criminal liability of a person who sets out to kill but fails to produce death. The classification determines which crime is charged and the penalty range. Practitioners must understand the “subjective phase” test and the evidentiary requirements for mortal wounds to argue for or against a frustrated charge.

2. How do Articles 50 to 57 of the Revised Penal Code graduate penalties for principals, accomplices, and accessories, and what penalties are imposable in attempted or frustrated homicide? Once the stage of the crime is identified, the correct penalty must be computed by lowering the penalty for the consummated offense by one or two degrees, and then applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The rules for determining the penalty next lower in degree are crucial for drafting informations and for plea bargaining.

Section II — Legal Analysis

Issue 1: Distinction among consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, with focus on homicide

Applicable Laws & Issuances

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) defines the three stages:

“A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”

The provision establishes two pivotal criteria: (1) the extent of the acts of execution performed, and (2) the reason the full result did not occur.

Case Law Analysis

United States v. Lim San, G.R. No. L‑5335 — 8 November 1910

Focus of Dispute: Whether the accused’s actions constituted frustrated murder or only attempted murder.

Facts: Lim San attacked Keng Kin with a bolo, striking him in the face. The blow penetrated the left eye and reached the brain. The wound would have been fatal but for prompt medical treatment. After the assault, Lim San believed the victim was dead and voluntarily stopped. He was charged with frustrated murder.

Disposition: The Supreme Court held the crime was frustrated murder, not attempted murder.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court formulated the classic distinction:

“In frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death, however, fails to follow for causes entirely apart from his will. In attempted murder the accused begins the commission of the crime by overt acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the other acts … by some cause outside of his own will.”

Because Lim San believed he had killed the victim when he desisted, the subjective phase of the crime was completed; death did not ensue solely because of medical intervention — a cause independent of his will. The penalty was reduced by one degree under the predecessor of Article 50.

Evidence Evaluated: Testimonies of victim and witnesses established the sudden, treacherous attack and the gravity of the wound; medical evidence showed the wound would have been fatal absent treatment. The Court found these sufficient.

Precedential Status: This is the fountainhead of the “subjective phase” test and remains good law, repeatedly cited in subsequent cases.

People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463 — 18 December 1930

Focus of Dispute: Whether the facts constituted frustrated murder or attempted murder.

Facts: Basilio Borinaga announced his intent to stab Harry Mooney, then stabbed at Mooney’s back through a window. The knife lodged in the chair instead of the victim’s body. Mooney was uninjured. Borinaga later admitted he “missed his mark.”

Disposition: The Court affirmed the conviction for frustrated murder.

Ratio Decidendi: Applying the Lim San rule, the Court held that “the essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator.” The subjective phase was passed because the assailant had struck with full homicidal intent and believed his act would kill; the fact that the knife hit the chair and not the man was an external, independent cause.

Evidence Evaluated: The prosecution’s evidence showed the accused’s prior declaration of intent, the deadly weapon, the treacherous manner, and the accused’s post-attack statement that he missed his mark — all indicative of completed subjective acts. The Court rejected the accused’s alibi.

Precedential Status: Reinforced the subjective-phase doctrine and clarified that a “miss” caused by an external impediment (e.g., knife hitting a chair) does not reduce the crime to attempted.

People v. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L‑5848 — 30 April 1954

Focus of Dispute: Whether the defendant committed frustrated murder or attempted murder when the victim escaped after being shot.

Facts: The accused shot Tan Siong Kiap, who was hit but managed to run and hide in another room. The accused saw him escape and did not pursue. The trial court convicted of frustrated murder.

Disposition: The Supreme Court found the accused guilty only of attempted murder.

Ratio Decidendi: Applying the subjective-phase test, the Court emphasized that it is sufficient if the accused believes he has performed all acts of execution. However, because the victim’s escape was witnessed by the accused, “the fact that he was able to escape … must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim.” Thus, the subjective phase was not completed, and the crime was only attempted.

Evidence Evaluated: Uncontradicted testimony that the victim escaped and the accused saw him. The medical evidence showed the wound was not fatal. The accused’s confession was also considered.

Precedential Status: Important limitation on the subjective-phase doctrine: if the actor knows he has not yet done everything needed to kill, the crime remains attempted.

Crisanto Amerga y Lapuz v. People, G.R. No. 250461 — 20 January 2021 (First Division)

Focus of Dispute: Whether the accused should be convicted of frustrated homicide or only attempted homicide given the medical evidence on the victim’s wound.

Facts: Amerga stabbed the victim. The prosecution’s doctor testified the victim could have bled to death without medical attention, but on cross-examination admitted the victim could have survived even without intervention. The trial court and Court of Appeals convicted of frustrated homicide.

Disposition: The Supreme Court modified the conviction to attempted homicide, reducing the penalty by two degrees.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court enumerated the elements of frustrated homicide: (1) intent to kill manifested by use of a deadly weapon; (2) the victim sustained a fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; (3) no qualifying circumstances for murder. It stressed that “the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds.” Because the medical testimony created doubt about whether the wound was truly mortal, the second element was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The crime was therefore attempted homicide only.

Evidence Evaluated: The doctor’s ambivalent testimony (“possibility that he will still live” without treatment) was insufficient to prove mortal character. The prosecution failed to present detailed wound documentation, treatment records, or recovery time.

Precedential Status: This is the most recent controlling authority on the evidentiary burden for frustrated homicide; it clarifies that doubt on the mortal nature of the wound benefits the accused and results in an attempted crime.

Doctrinal Synthesis

The current legal position is summarized as follows:

• Consummated felony: All elements of the crime are present. For homicide, death occurs. No further act remain to be done.
• Frustrated felony: The offender performs all acts of execution that would produce the felony, but the result does not occur due to a cause independent of his will. In homicide, the accused must have intended to kill, the victim must have sustained a mortal wound, and survival must be attributable to timely medical aid. The offender must also have believed he had done everything necessary to kill (subjective phase completed).
• Attempted felony: The offender commences execution by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution because of a cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In homicide, either (a) the wound is not mortal, or (b) the accused did not believe he had completed the acts of execution (e.g., he saw the victim escape), or (c) some external event prevented him from completing all intended acts.

The determination of the stage is made at the trial level and rests heavily on medical evidence, the nature of the weapon, and the circumstances of the assault. An accused’s own belief — inferred from his actions — is decisive for the passed/failed subjective phase.

Recent Developments

The Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. No. 254875 (13 February 2023) — People v. Jonie Sabandal Pilen — reaffirmed the statutory definitions and the jurisprudential distinction: (1) in frustrated felony, the offender has performed all acts of execution; in attempted, he merely commences; (2) the reason for non-accomplishment is a cause independent of the will in frustration, while in attempt it is some cause other than spontaneous desistance. The decision also explicitly restated that when a mortal wound is proved and survival is due to medical aid, the crime is frustrated murder or homicide; if the wound is not fatal, the crime is only attempted. No later rulings (2024‑2026) depart from this doctrine. The case G.R. No. 260944 (3 April 2024) — People v. Fernan Calines y Magastino — dealt with penalty computation but implicitly confirmed the stage distinction.

Analysis

Applied to homicide: Suppose the accused stabs the victim with a knife, piercing the lung. The victim is rushed to the hospital and undergoes emergency surgery that saves his life. The accused, after the stab, believed the victim would die and fled. Here, all acts of execution were performed (the stab), the wound was mortal, and death was averted solely by medical intervention. The subjective phase is satisfied because the accused did not see the victim survive and had no reason to think he needed to do more. This is frustrated homicide. If, however, the wound is superficial and the victim could have recovered without surgery, or the accused saw the victim walk away, the crime is only attempted homicide, because either the wound is not mortal or the accused knew he had not done enough.

The critical evidentiary burden lies with the prosecution: it must present a physician who will testify categorically that the wound was fatal and that without medical treatment the victim would have died. Any equivocation (Amerga, G.R. No. 250461) will result in a downgrade to attempted homicide. Defense counsel should explore whether the prosecution’s medical evidence establishes certainty, and may also argue that the accused’s knowledge (e.g., he saw the victim escape) prevented completion of the subjective phase.

Issue 2: Penalty graduation under Articles 50 to 57 of the Revised Penal Code for attempted/frustrated homicide

Applicable Laws & Issuances

The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) provides:

• Article 50: “The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.”
• Article 51: “The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.”
• Article 52: “The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.”
• Article 53: “The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.”
• Article 54: “The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.”
• Article 55: “The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.”
• Article 56: “The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.”
• Article 57: “The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempt shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.”

Article 61 (Rules for Graduating Penalties) and Article 71 (Graduated scales) govern how to determine the penalty “next lower in degree” using the scale of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional, arresto mayor, destierro, etc. For divisible penalties, the lower degree is the immediately following penalty in the scale; when the penalty is composed of periods, the rules in paragraphs 2‑4 of Article 61 apply. Article 60 clarifies that Articles 50‑57 do not apply if the law expressly prescribes a penalty for a frustrated or attempted felony.

For homicide, Article 249 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the consummated offense.

Case Law Analysis

Crisanto Amerga v. People, G.R. No. 250461 — 20 January 2021 (First Division)

Focus of Dispute: Proper penalty for attempted homicide.

Disposition: The Court imposed an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, applying Article 51 (penalty two degrees lower) and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Ratio Decidendi: Homicide carries reclusion temporal. Two degrees lower is prision correccional. Under ISL, the maximum is taken from the proper penalty (prision correccional in its medium period, given no aggravating/mitigating circumstances), and the minimum is from the penalty next lower in degree (arresto mayor). The Court awarded civil indemnity and moral damages.

Precedential Status: Authoritative for attempted homicide penalty computation.

Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512 — 26 November 2014 (Second Division)

Focus of Dispute: Correct penalty and civil liability for frustrated homicide.

Disposition: The Supreme Court corrected the lower court’s erroneous indeterminate sentence and imposed four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and awarded additional damages.

Ratio Decidendi: Frustrated homicide is penalized by prision mayor (one degree lower than reclusion temporal). The Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the minimum to be within the range of the penalty next lower (prision correccional). The maximum is within prision mayor. The specific periods depend on the presence of mitigating/aggravating circumstances. The Court also discussed the requirement of intent to kill, noting that the chest wound penetrating the lung established this intent.

Evidence Evaluated: Medical certificates and testimony proved the wound was mortal and required surgery. The unprovoked attack and the weapon used supported intent to kill.

Precedential Status: Provides a practical illustration of penalty computation for frustrated homicide.

Eric Rescubillo v. People, G.R. No. 237854 — 6 June 2018 (Second Division)

Focus of Dispute: Conviction for attempted homicide and proper sentence.

Disposition: Affirmed the conviction and imposed an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, plus damages.

Ratio Decidendi: Applied Article 51 — attempted homicide carries prision correccional (two degrees lower). The Court noted that the accused commenced the commission of homicide by overt acts but failed to complete all acts because the victim escaped. The penalty computation followed the same method as in Amerga.

Precedential Status: Consistent with prior rulings.

Web‑Sourced Cases:

• G.R. No. 254875 (13 February 2023) — People v. Jonie Sabandal Pilen. The decision quotes Article 6 and expressly states the penalties: for frustrated homicide, indeterminate sentence of three (3) years of prision correccional minimum to eight (8) years and two (2) months of prision mayor maximum; for attempted homicide, three (3) months of arresto mayor minimum to three (3) years of prision correccional maximum.
• G.R. No. 260944 (3 April 2024) — People v. Fernan Calines y Magastino confirms that the prescribed penalty for attempted homicide is prision correccional and applies the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Recent Developments

The 2023 and 2024 decisions (G.R. Nos. 254875 and 260944) are entirely consistent with the statutory scheme and the earlier jurisprudence. No legislative change (e.g., Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted fines and penalties for certain crimes) affected the core rules for frustrated/attempted homicide; that law mainly dealt with fines and penalties for theft, estafa, and other property crimes, not with Articles 6 or 50‑57. The existing graduation rules remain unchanged.

Analysis

The penalty structure for homicide, broken down by stage and participation, is as follows:

Practical Example: A and B conspire to kill C. A stabs C, inflicting a lung wound; B serves as lookout. C is saved by a surgeon. A is a principal by direct participation; the crime is frustrated homicide, penalty prision mayor. A’s indeterminate sentence: minimum 4 years prision correccional to maximum 8 years and 1 day prision mayor (if no aggravating/mitigating). B, as an accomplice, receives prision correccional under Art. 54 (one degree lower than frustrated’s prision mayor). B’s indeterminate sentence: minimum within arresto mayor, maximum within prision correccional. If the wound were only superficial and not mortal, the crime would be attempted homicide for both; A gets prision correccional, B as accomplice would get arresto mayor under Art. 56.

In computing the indeterminate sentence, the court first determines the penalty for the crime (under the applicable RPC article and graduation rules), then sets the maximum term within the range of that penalty (considering modifying circumstances), and sets the minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower in degree. The judge has discretion within the periods, but must follow the formula. Counsel should argue for the most favorable period, e.g., minimum in the minimum period of the lower degree.

Section III — Action Plan & Evidence Guide

Recommended Strategy: In prosecuting or defending a charge of attempted or frustrated homicide, the critical battleground is the medical evidence and the circumstances indicating the accused’s subjective belief. For the prosecution, secure a detailed medical report and testimony that establishes the wound was mortal and that death would have ensued without the specific treatment given. For the defense, explore whether the wound could have healed without medical intervention; cross‑examine the physician on probabilities, and present evidence that the accused knew he had not completed the act (e.g., he saw the victim flee). If the prosecution’s evidence is weak, move for a downgrade to attempted homicide or even physical injuries, which significantly reduces the penalty.

Action Steps

1. Obtain and review all medical records immediately after arrest — these include the initial emergency room chart, the operative record, the discharge summary, and the attending physician’s notes. They will contain the wound description, vital signs, blood loss estimate, and whether the patient would have died without treatment.
2. Engage a medico-legal consultant early — have an independent surgeon or forensic pathologist review the records and opine on whether the wound was “necessarily fatal” or merely “could have been fatal.” This opinion will determine the credibility of the prosecution’s mortal-wound claim.
3. Interview witnesses who observed the assault and its aftermath — gather statements about whether the accused pursued the victim, made any exclamation indicating he thought the victim was dead or not, and whether he voluntarily desisted. This goes to the subjective phase.
4. Draft the Information with precision — if the evidence is strong for a mortal wound, charge frustrated homicide (or frustrated murder if qualifying circumstances exist). If the wound is not clearly mortal, charge only attempted homicide to avoid a possible acquittal or downgrade at trial. For accomplices and accessories, identify their specific participation to correctly allege the appropriate penalty range.
5. In plea bargaining, use the penalty graduation table to negotiate — a frustrated homicide principal may consider pleading to attempted homicide if the medical evidence is equivocal; the penalty drops from prision mayor to prision correccional. For accomplices, use the further reduction to propose a lower sentence.

Evidence Checklist

• Medical Certificate / Medico‑Legal Report — details the nature, depth, trajectory, and severity of the wound; indicates whether the wound was fatal and whether specific medical intervention prevented death. Obtained from the attending hospital or the PNP Crime Laboratory.
• Testimony of the Attending Physician — explains why the victim would have died without treatment, the type of emergency intervention, and the time frame — essential to prove the “mortal wound” element.
• Weapon Used — the type of weapon (knife, gun, bolo) and its capacity to cause death help prove intent to kill. Preserve the weapon as evidence.
• Photographs of the Victim’s Injuries — taken immediately after the incident, they corroborate the medical findings and can show the location of the wound (vital areas). Source: police crime scene photographers or hospital records.
• Witness Affidavits — describing the manner of attack, whether the accused stopped voluntarily or was prevented, whether he saw the victim escape, and any statement made after the assault — relevant to the subjective phase and intent.
• Police Report / Spot Report — initial account, may contain admissions or observations that bear on the stage of the crime.
• Certification of Timely Medical Assistance — from the hospital indicating the time of admission and that the victim was treated immediately; this ties survival to medical intervention rather than to the non‑mortal nature of the wound.

⚠️ This is AI-generated legal research for reference only. It does not constitute legal advice. Consult a licensed Philippine attorney before making important legal decisions.

References

Legislation & Regulatory Issuances

• Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

Case Law

• United States v. Lim San, G.R. No. L‑5335 (8 November 1910)
• People of the Philippine Islands v. Basilio Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463 (18 December 1930)
• People of the Philippines v. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L‑5848 (30 April 1954)
• Crisanto Amerga y Lapuz v. People, G.R. No. 250461 (20 January 2021)
• Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512 (26 November 2014)
• Eric Rescubillo v. People, G.R. No. 237854 (6 June 2018)
• G.R. No. 254875 (13 February 2023) — People v. Jonie Sabandal Pilen
• G.R. No. 260944 (3 April 2024) — People v. Fernan Calines y Magastino